Educational Costs of Less Violent and Non-Violent
Pakistan-India Conflict in Pakistan

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This study attempts to answer the question that how low intensity level violent and non-violent/latent Pakistan-India conflict has affected school enrollment and public educational spending in Pakistan. This study hypothesizes that less- or non-violent Pakistan-India conflict deteriorates school enrollment and public educational spending in Pakistan through its interaction with; internal conflict, political institutions, and defense spending in Pakistan. School enrollment and public educational spending in Pakistan have been regressed upon Pakistan-India conflict along with interacting variables, i.e. Pak-India*Internal Conflict, Pak-India*polity, Pak-India*Milex. The coefficient on Pakistan-India conflict comes out to be insignificant which indicates the absence of direct effect of this conflict on education. However, as far as the indirect effects of this conflict are concerned, the effect of internal conflict and political institutions in Pakistan on enrollment becomes negative and significant when interacted with Pakistan-India conflict. The estimation results do not support the guns for butter theory in Pakistan.

Keywords: latent conflict, less-violent conflict, Pakistan-India conflict, school enrollment, public education Spending

This study analyzes the educational costs of less violent and latent (non-violent) conflict between Pakistan and India in the years from 1972 to 2004. The novelty of this study lies in its analysis of the indirect adverse human costs of latent international conflicts in form of lower school enrollment rates and lower spending by government son education. The conflict between Pakistan and India has often been limited to verbal threats, antagonistic statements, and expulsion of each other's diplomats. It occasionally results in arms race and border clashes. This conflict has not been escalated to the high intensity level war that may destroy physical and human capital on such a scale to cause deterioration in human development indicators like life expectancy and educational enrollment. However, the present study tries to estimate the educational costs in Pakistan due to the latent conflict between Pakistan and India through its interaction with some of the important intervening variables. The violent and latent internal and international conflicts cause deterioration in human development but in different ways.

The violent internal and international wars destroy human capital and physical capital which in turn deteriorate human development like education and health. The schools are destroyed and the teachers are killed or deployed in some war related activities. The parents need their kids to help

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them in rehabilitation and earning some income during war instead of sending them to schools. The school buildings also are occupied by the security forces and are no more available for teaching and learning activities. However, the latent conflicts do not cause such destruction of physical and human capital. Instead, latent conflicts between countries divert the attention and resources of the state from human security to state security. Spending on defense and security takes precedence over spending on education and health of the people. The voices of the civil society and democratic forces for peace and human development are given no heed in times of tense relations with the rival country. The complaints and protest of the aggrieved regions and communities are silenced on the pretext of national security and integrity of the country in times of heightened relations between countries. The present study therefore tries to answer the question that how latent international conflicts like the conflict between Pakistan and India deteriorates human development in Pakistan. It is analyzed that whether the conflict between Pakistan and India when interacts with the domestic variables in Pakistan, that is, civil strife, political institutions, and military spending, has any bearing upon the human development like education in Pakistan. The study finds that the latent conflict between Pakistan and India, from 1972 to 2004, deteriorates school enrollment in Pakistan through its interaction with civil strife and political institutions in Pakistan.

Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses of the Study

The interconnection between international conflict and development through public spending on military and social sector, internal conflict, and civil and democratic institutions provides theoretical framework to this study. The present study puts forward the argument that the internal conflicts and civil strife become more detrimental for human development when these are interacted with the latent international conflicts. Conflict between two countries even if it is non-violent (latent) causes harmful internal conflicts in the rival countries. The rival countries may extend direct military and financial support to the aggrieved regions and communities and thus making harmful an otherwise harmless or sometimes beneficial struggle of the rebel groups (Thyne, 2009, 2006, Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006, Gleditsch & Beardsley, 2004, Cetinyan, 2002, Sambanis, 2001, & Moore, 1995). When there is conflict between countries, the rival countries exploit the nationalistic sentiments of the people to make national security as top priority (Mueller, 1973; Levy, 1989). The war frenzy makes the general masses and even the civil society antagonistic against the dissenting voices of the people and regions who consider themselves as oppressed and exploited. The state, in times of international conflicts, deals the rebels and dissidents with high handedness thus pushing them further into poverty and underdevelopment. This is just the opposite of when a country is not involved in a conflict with another country and the government redresses the grievances of the aggrieved people and regions by spending on their health, education, and social sector. The above discussion leads the present study to hypothesize that the otherwise harmless internal conflict in a country may cause deterioration in education and health of the people and thus low human development in that country if it is having a conflict with another country.

The effect of democracy on health, education, and human development varies in presence and absence of conflict and rivalry between countries. Democracy is found to have positive correlation with health and education of the people and thus human development (Pridmore, 2007, Ding et al., 2006, Behrman, 1996). However, conflict and rivalry between countries causes increased militarization of the state at the expense of civil and democratic institutions. In times of tense international relations, the political and democratic institutions in a country face serious threats of militarization (Tilly, 1975, 1990) and thus fail to prioritize human welfare and human development. People face economic hardships as the state reduces spending on human welfare and human

development and increases spending on defense and military related activities. This makes people unhappy with the incumbent regime (DeNardo, 1985, Lamborn, 1991, Organski&Kugler, 1980) and thus results in political instability in the country (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1992, & Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1997, Reiter, 2001, Thompson, 1996). The net result is the bare neglect of education and health of the masses. The previous discussion leads the present study to hypothesize that political and democratic institutions fail to improve the educational and health status of the people and thus human development in a country if that country is having even a non-violent (latent) conflict with another country.

Collier (2006) says that development is the best way towards a safe and secure society and not the military buildup. However, the countries that are engaged in any sort of conflict with other countries spend more on defense and military related activities than spending on education, health, and human development. The hike in military spending is not only caused by more destructive wars but also by latent conflicts and enduring rivalries (Collier, 2006).This hike in military spending is often brought at the expense of spending on human welfare and development (Russet, 1969; Dixon & Moon, 1986; Adeola, 1996).The above discussion leads the present study to hypothesize that countries put cuts on spending for health, education, and human development to increase military spending if these countries are involved in some sort of conflicts with other countries, whether these conflicts are violent or latent.

The above discussion explains the theoretical underpinning of the current study. The theoretical framework of this study may be shown in the following figure. It shows that less violent and latent international conflicts deteriorates human development by interacting with internal conflicts, institutions, and military expenditures.


Figure: Conflict and Development: Theoretical Framework

Method

This study estimates the following four equations to test the hypotheses. As the human welfare and human development are represented in this study by school enrollment and spending on education in a country, so the enrollment and educational spending variables are regressed upon different explanatory variables. The first equation shows the direct effect of Pakistan-India conflict on the dependent variable, i.e. school enrollment in Pakistan. The other three equations include

interacting variables as explanatory variables to capture the indirect effect of Pakistan-India conflict through its interaction with variables like civil strife, institutions, and spending on military in Pakistan on the dependent variables, i.e. school enrollment and public spending on education. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method has been used to estimate the following equations.

$$(Enrollment\ Rate)_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1(Pak - India\ Conflict)_t + \alpha_2(Civil\ Strife)_t + \alpha_3(Institutions)_t$$
$$+\alpha_i(Control\ Variables)_t + \varepsilon_t \tag{1}$$

$$(Enrollment\ Rate)_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1(Pak - India\ Conflict)_t + \alpha_2(Civil\ Strife)_t + \alpha_3(Institutions)_t$$
$$+\alpha_4(Pak - India * Civil\ Strife)_t + \alpha_i(Control\ Variables)_t + \varepsilon_t$$
$$\tag{2}$$

$$(Enrollment\ Rate)_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1(Pak - India\ Conflict)_t + \alpha_2(Institutions)_t$$
$$+\alpha_3(Pak - India * Institutions)_t + \alpha_i(Control\ Variables)_t + \varepsilon_t \tag{3}$$

$$(Public\ Educational\ Spending)_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1(Pak - India\ Conflict)_t + \alpha_2(Military\ ExPenditure)$$
$$+\alpha_3(Pak - India * Military\ ExPenditure)_t + \alpha_i(Control\ Variables)_t + \varepsilon_t$$
$$\tag{4}$$

Dependent Variables

The enrollment in schools at different levels of education has been used as one of the dependent variables in the above equations. School enrollment is one of the dimensions of the human development index (HDI) of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The data on this variable has been taken from UNDP (2010).The data on public educational spending in Pakistan is hard to find so the yearly growth rates of schools, colleges, universities, and teachers are reduced to a single component through principal component method to proxy the government spending on education. The Handbook of Statistics on Pakistan Economy, State Bank of Pakistan (2010) is the main source of data for this variable.

Independent Variables

The most important explanatory variable of this study is the latent conflict between Pakistan and India during 1972-2004. The two important events datasets, that is, WEIS (1966-1992) and the IDEA (1990-2004), are used to extract data on the latent (non-violent) conflict between Pakistan and India. The values of the variable ranges between -10 (high conflict) and +8.3 (friendly) after the application of the Goldstein's (1992) scale to the data extracted from WEIS and IDEA. The other variable of interest is the conflict and civil strife within Pakistan and Banks (2010) provides data on this variable. The next independent variable of the present study is the type of regime in Pakistan as proxy of institutions in the country. The Polity IV is the main source of data for this variable and the value of this variable ranges between +10 (strong democracy) to -10 (strong autocracy). The Pak-India*Civil Strife; the Pak-India*Institutions; and the Pak-India*Military Expenditure are the interacting variables for capturing the indirect effect of the conflict between Pakistan and India on school enrollment in Pakistan. The present study takes life expectancy at birth, fertility rate, public

educational spending, and the annual growth rate of population of 14 years and below in Pakistan as control variables in the first three equations. The World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank (2011) is the main source of data for the above control variables except public educational spending which is represented in this study by the principal component constructed from the growth rate of educational institutions and teachers.

The most important independent variable in the public educational spending equation (equation 4) is the military expenditure in Pakistan. The main source of data on this variable is Na Hou (2009). The data is in the form of constant 2000 US billion Dollars. The per GDP per capita of Pakistan in constant 2000 US Dollars and public consumption expenditure (final) less military expenditure in constant 2000 US billion Dollars(Government Expenditure) are used as control variables in equation 4. The World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank (2011) is the main source of data on both the above control variables. The total value of foreign aid to support education and health in Pakistan is the other control variable in equation 4.The main source of data on this control variable is Rashid and Chaudhary (2011) in constant 2000 US billion Dollars.

Data and Estimation Procedure

The data on all the variables is for the period of 1972-2004.The cutoff point of the data is 2004 as the events data on the conflict between Pakistan and India is not available beyond 2004. The year of 1972 is taken as the starting date because of the fact that Pakistan was disintegrated in 1971 and the rebirth of a new Pakistan was happened that year. The choice of the time period has also been driven by the motivation to analyze the human development cost of the latent (non-violent) conflict between Pakistan and India. The conflict between Pakistan and India has been mostly remained latent (non-violent) during 1972-2004. The problem of endogeneity has been taken care of by taking vales of the independent variables with one year lag. Furthermore as our data is time series, therefore, we have tested the presence of unit root in variables of the model except polity, which is a categorical variable. For this purpose, we have used augmented Dickey Fuller test. The results of the test can be obtained on request. All variables are found to be stationary at level; therefore, the OLS estimator is appropriate. The OLS estimator is efficient and consistent in this case.

Results and Discussion

The following table 1 presents the results of the estimation for the above given four equations regarding the effect of the latent conflict between Pakistan and India during 1972-2004 upon enrollment and public educational spending in Pakistan. The dependent variable in the first three equations is the enrollment rate in different levels of education in Pakistan. The dependent variable in the last equation is the public educational spending in Pakistan.

Table 2
Estimation Results for Enrollment Rate (ER) and Public Educational Spending in Pakistan (PES)

Independent Variables	Equation 1 (ER)	Equation 2 (ER)	Equation 3 (ER)	Equation 4 (PES)
Conflict between Pakistan and	-4.945636 (0.1810)	-3.172063 (0.4971)	-6.735558*** (0.0029)	-1.419584 (0.1833)

India				
Civil Strife in Pakistan	1.236263 (0.1437)	5.861295 (0.2031)		
Institutions	0.169544*** (0.0124)	0.177789*** (0.0117)	0.360456*** (0.0000)	
Pak-India* Civil Strife		-18.22422 (0.3138)		
Pak-India* Institutions			-0.843949*** (0.0020)	
Longevity	0.331644* (0.0976)	0.332797 (0.1255)	0.655139*** (0.0014)	
Rate of Fertility	-10.86845*** (0.0002)	-10.94921*** (0.0003)	-9.919241*** (0.0001)	
Population	813.2885** (0.0256)	829.3310** (0.0241)	814.5597*** (0.0145)	
Public Educational Spending	-0.486312 (0.3651)	-0.594961 (0.2999)	-0.641547 (0.3045)	
Military expenditure				2.39** (0.0229)
Pak-India*Military expenditure				2.26*** (0.0000)
Log(GDP/capita)				-3.464868 (0.3817)
Foreign Aid				1.14* (0.0959)
Govt. Exp.				-1.00* (0.0010)
Constant	75.56903*** (0.0042)	75.54493*** (0.0071)	51.37491** (0.0165)	18.85699 (0.3853)
	R-squared=0.955957	R-squared=0.957517	R-squared=0.963632	R-squared=0.579638
	F-stat=71.31661***	F-stat=61.98231***	F-stat=87.05962***	F-stat=5.52***

***P<=1%, **P<=5%, *P<=10%, P values are in parentheses.

Estimation results for equation 1 reflect the immediate consequences of the latent conflict between Pakistan and India for enrollment rate in Pakistan. The coefficient on the conflict between Pakistan and India is negative though insignificant statistically which signifies the non-violent (latent) nature of this conflict during 1972-2004. This conflict never escalated to the level of high intensity level violent war during the time period of the study and thus did not cause destruction on the mass

level. The coefficient on civil strife in Pakistan comes out as positive though insignificant statistically which seems contrary to the expectations. The institutional variable representing democracy is positively and significantly affecting the enrollment rate. The result on institutions affirms the common perception that democracies are pro people and care for human development. The longevity variable representing health of the people comes out positive and statistically significant which signifies the importance of health for educational attainment (Pridmore, 2007, Ding et al., 2006; Behrman, 1996). The fertility variable as indicator of women health and women empowerment is negatively and significantly affecting the enrollment rate which signifies the important role of women health and women empowerment for kids' education. The population variable representing the young population up to the age of 14 comes out positive and statistically significant as according to the expectations. The variable of public educational spending comes out negative and statistically insignificant as against the expectations which might be due to lack of appropriate data on the government educational spending in Pakistan.

The estimation results for equation 2 shows that how conflict between Pakistan and India affects school enrollment in Pakistan when this conflict interacts with the civil strife in the country. The interaction between the two types of conflicts is captured by the interacting variable, i.e. Pak-India*Civil Strife. The coefficients on the interacting variable and the constituent variables are statistically insignificant. The regression results of the study does not support the hypothesis that latent conflict between Pakistan and India when interacts with the civil strife in Pakistan may lead to low educational enrollment. The other variables in the equation are having results which are consistent with the theory.

The estimation results for equation 3 shows that how conflict between Pakistan and India affects school enrollment in Pakistan when interacts with institutions in the country. The interactive term of Pak-India*Institutions has been used in the equation to analyze the effect of the conflict between Pakistan and India when interacts with democracy on school enrollment in Pakistan. The interactive term of Pakistan-India*Institutions and its constituent terms are statistically significant and carry the right signs. However, the interactive term is not explained instead the constituent terms are explained by assuming zero value for one of the constituent terms while interpreting the coefficient on the other term and vice versa. The above regression results reveal that the coefficient on democracy is 0.360456 while keeping the conflict between Pakistan and India as equal to zero. The result can be interpreted as when there is no conflict between Pakistan and India, the increase of one point in democracy lead to 0.360456 points increase in enrollment. It is also worth mentioning that when there is no conflict between Pakistan and India, the democracy is two times more effective in increasing school enrollment than when there is conflict between Pakistan and India as is evident by comparing the values of the coefficients of the two variables in this and in the previous two equations. The coefficient value for conflict between Pakistan and India is -6.735558 which is significant statistically and carries the right sign, i.e. negative. It can be interpreted as when the democracy variable is equal to zero, the school enrollment in Pakistan is lowered by 6.735558 if the conflict between Pakistan and India intensifies by one point. The conflict between Pakistan and India is twice harmful for school enrollment if there is no democracy in Pakistan as compared to when there is democracy in the country and this result can be confirmed by comparing the coefficient values of this variable in the first three equations.

The final and 4th equation of the study shows estimation results for how the public spending on education changes when public military expenditures interacts with the conflict between Pakistan

and India. This is the third hypothesis of the study and that is also known as testing the guns for butter theory. The logic is simple. When there is conflict between Pakistan and India, the Pakistani government diverts spending from the social sector like education to increase spending on the military. The Pak-India*Military Expenditure as interacting explanatory variable is used in this equation to estimate the effect of changing military expenditure due to changing Pakistan-India relations upon the public educational spending in Pakistan. The dependent variable in this equation is the government of Pakistan spending on education that is represented by the principal component index of teachers and educational structures. The other variables that have been used in the previous literature are gross domestic product per capita, the aid to Pakistan from foreign countries and sources in sectors of education and health, and Pakistan's government net consumption expenditure (total government consumption expenditure minus public spending on military). The estimation results do support the presence of some sort of interaction between public military expenditures and the conflict between Pakistan and India as evident from the statistically significant coefficient of Pak-India*Military Expenditure. The one constituent variable of the interactive term, i.e. the conflict between Pakistan and India, is carrying the right sign though insignificant statistically while the other constituent variable of the interactive term, i.e. the military expenditure, is statistically significant though carries the positive sign which is against the theory. The estimation results of the fourth equation fail to tell anything about the negative impact of increased military expenditures due to increased tension between Pakistan and India upon the cuts in government spending on education. It needs further analysis. The results further explain that economic growth in Pakistan does not translate into increase in spending on education by the government which is evident from the statistically insignificant coefficient of gross domestic product. This is classic example of growth without development as explained by Easterly (2001). The financial help by other countries to support the educational sector in Pakistan carries the positive sign and is significant statistically. The coefficient on net government consumption expenditures carries negative sign and is significant statistically which points towards the financing of government consumption expenditures at the expense of public spending on education.

Conclusion

The non-violent or latent international conflicts do have detrimental effects on education which is an important indicator of human development. However, the latent international conflicts are associated with low levels of education, health, and other indicators of human development in the rival countries through civil strife, military spending, and political institutions. The empirical results of this study affirm the proposition that Pakistan-India conflict does not have direct negative effects on education in Pakistan. Political institutions in Pakistan come out as the most important intervening variable through which this conflict negatively affect educational enrollment in Pakistan. The other intervening variable, i.e. civil strife, is statistically insignificant and its interaction with Pakistan-India conflict does not prove the hypothesis of the study. It needs to be analyzed and explained further by employing some other suitable estimation strategy like Boehmke's (2006) grinter data utility.

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